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Overpricing (and Underpricing) in IPOs:
A Model of Excess Initial Returns
Abstract
This paper develops a model in which new issues, in equilibrium, may be
overpriced or underpriced, depending on parameter values. The ability of an
investor to withdraw from the oering upon observing unfavorable information
implies that the decision to participate in it contains a valuable option. It is
shown that the presence of this option will generate overpricing in equilibrium
to the extent that the option value exceeds the corresponding adverse selection
cost. The empirical implications of the model are closely consistent with the
pattern of overpricing and underpricing revealed by the data.
Keywords: initial public oerings, overpricing, option value, underpricing, win-
ner's curse, over-allotment option.
JEL Classication: G10, G32
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1 Introduction
The underpricing of Initial Public Oerings (IPOs) of common stocks is well known.
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The overall evidence, however, reveals average overpricing as well as underpricing,
depending on the type of security oered for sale. And while the underpricing phe-
nomenon is relatively well understood, the overpricing phenomenon is not. Indeed, why
are some types of IPOs overpriced on average, while others are underpriced? This paper
attempts to answer this question by developing a model in which IPOs, in equilibrium,
may be overpriced as well as underpriced, depending on parameter values.
The formal model extends the winner's curse argument of Rock (1986), where un-
derpricing arises as a compensation to less-informed investors for the adverse selection
risk that they incur in competing against better informed investors for allocations.
The main adjustments relative to Rock are (a) to allow the number of shares oated
in the oering to be positively related to demand
2
, and (b) to let less-informed (as
well as well-informed) investors obtain independent signals about the issue. As in
Rock, underpricing arises as a result of adverse selection in the allocation of shares
moving the distribution that generates the returns observed in the market to stochas-
tically dominate (in the rst order sense) the allocation weighted distribution relevant
to less-informed investors. The present paper, using a more general specication of
the IPO market, shows that this return dominance may be reversed and thus generate
overpricing in equilibrium, despite the presence of adverse selection.
Intuitively, letting less-informed investors observe independent signals implies that
investors will request shares in the oering only upon obtaining favorable information.
This implies in turn that the conditional expectation relevant to investors actually
submitting bids in the oering will exceed the unconditional expectation implied by
the returns observed in the market. However, whether this is sucient to generate
overpricing in equilibrium will depend on the corresponding adverse selection problem.
In general, it is shown that the IPO will be overpriced in equilibrium (rather than
underpriced) to the extent that the number of shares that are oated in the oering is
1
See e.g. Ibbotson and Ritter (1997) for a review.
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In rm commitment contracts this obtains through the over-allotment option, which allows the
underwriter to increase the number of shares by up to 15% of the amount stated in the oering
prospectus. The over-allotment option contributes to a positive relation between the supply of shares
and demand if the probability of it being exercised is increasing in the amount of ex-post underpricing.
(Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) and Aggrawal (1998) nd that this is indeed the case for IPOs of
common stocks). Best eorts are marketed with a pre-specied maximum and minimum number of
shares to be oated, which generates the type positive relation between demand and supply indicated
in (a).
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suciently elastic with respect to demand, that investors are suciently similar in the
precision of their information, and that the fraction of well-informed to less-informed
investors is not too large.
From a slightly dierent perspective, the fact that less-informed investors (observing
independent signals) are able to withdraw from the issue upon observing unfavorable
information, implies that their participation gives them a potentially valuable option.
In a competitive market, however, the value of this option is captured by the issuer,
which may result in ex ante overpricing. Indeed, the oering will be overpriced in
equilibrium to the extent that the value of this option is greater than the corresponding
adverse selection cost.
In this sense, overpricing represents a benet of going public, reecting the ability of
the issuer to extract informational rents from less-informed investors. This is analogous
to, and nicely counterbalances, the underpricing cost arising from the adverse selection
problem facing the same set of investors.
As noted, our model suggests that a necessary condition for overpricing to arise
in equilibrium is that the number of shares oated is positively related to demand.
This follows Ritter's (1987) suggestion that a positive relation between the size of the
oering and the demand for allocations will ameliorate the winner's curse problem
facing less-informed investors and thus reduce the need for underpricing.
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The present
paper shows that if less-informed investors receive independent signals about the issue,
then a positive relation between the size of the oering and demand not only will reduce
the adverse selection problem facing less-informed investors, but may even reverse it
and generate overpricing in equilibrium.
As already indicated, the overall empirical evidence on IPOs indicates average over-
pricing in addition to underpricing. Specically, Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) nd
overpricing (at the 5 % level) in a sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
IPOs.
4
More recently, Datta, Iskander-Datta, and Patell (1997) nd zero excess initial
returns in their overall sample of corporate bonds IPOs, but signicant overpricing
3
Relatedly, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that these features will reduce the costs of eliciting
information from investors by reducing the required degree of underpricing. In Barzel, Habib, and
Johnsen (2000) underpricing is used as a tool to prevent excess search; they show that the use of
the over-allotment option reduces the prots from excess search and hence increases the critical price
at which the issue can be sold with zero excess search. Chowdry and Sherman (1996) show that
favoring uninformed investors will reduce the winner's curse problem, and hence reduce the need for
underpricing.
4
On the other hand, Ling and Ryngart (1997) nd underpricing in a more recent sample of REITs
IPOs. Consistent with the present model, they nd that this switch from overpricing to underpricing
is associated with greater adverse selection (for more on this, see Section 4).
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both in the case of investment grade bonds and bonds issued by NYSE/AMEX rms
(both signicant at the 1% level). Peavy (1990) nds zero initial returns in his overall
sample of IPOs of closed-end funds, but signicant overpricing (at the 1% level) in
the case of closed-end stock funds.
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Finally, Muscarella (1988) nds zero excess initial
returns in his overall sample of MLP IPOs, but overpricing (at the 10% level) in some
of his subsamples. Although the evidence on IPO overpricing is not as overwhelming
as the evidence on underpricing, it is at least as puzzling. Indeed, why would rational
prot maximizing investors buy securities that on average fall in price during the rst
day of trading?
The formal model is related to that of Chemmanur (1993), where underpricing
represents a compensation to informed investors for their costs of acquiring information
about the issue. In his model, as in Section 3 of the present paper, investors are
homogeneous in the precision of their information. But although overpricing does arise
in his model, he does not pursue this. In any case, an important dierence between
the two is that the present model includes an adverse selection problem as in Rock and
lets that be the source of underpricing. As we shall see, this produces a model with an
empirical content highly consistent with the pattern of IPO over/underpricing found
in the data.
6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
Section 3 assumes that investors are homogeneous in the precision of their information
and shows that only overpricing is possible in this case. Section 4 examines the general
case where there are both informed and less-informed investors present in the market,
in which case both overpricing and underpricing will be possible in equilibrium. Section
5
Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1992) nd overpricing in a sample of closed-end funds (all
sold with an over-allotment option). They nd that the negative initial returns in IPOs of closed-end
funds are signicantly dierent (at the 1% level) from the positive returns in a comparison sample of
common stock IPOs, but do not report the signicance level for negative returns on closed-end funds.
Weiss (1989) reports overpricing for both US stock funds (10 % level) and bond funds (5 % level) in
the case of index adjusted returns, but insignicant negative returns in the case of unadjusted returns.
Finally, Hanley, Lee, and Seguin (1996) nd no initial overpricing in their sample of closed-end fund
IPOs, but \sharp price declines" once the price stabilization period has ended. They suggest that
initial selling pressure indicates initial overpricing.
6
Also, the two models dier in the way over/underpricing is dened and derived. For example, while
we compare the IPO price to ex ante expected post-issuemarket value of completed issues, Chemmanur
compares it to the rm's ex ante expected true value (as is common). However, this requires that
IPOs never fail, which is not the case in practice. For example, Dunbar (1998) nd failure rates for
rm commitment oerings and best eort oerings to be around 30%. If these estimates are at the
high end, Benveniste, Busaba, and Guo (1999) in a more recent sample of rm commitment oerings
nd failure rates ranging from 7.5% to 23 %, which they nd to be large enough to change the sign
of some of their parameter estimates (see also footnote 9).
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Table 1: Sequence of Events
Date 0:  The issuer announces the terms of the oering fP
0
; N; n(); n

g:
 n^
I
2 [0; n
I
] well-informed investors and n^
u
2 [0; n
u
] less-informed
investors obtain favorable information and submit bids.
 If n^
I
+ n^
u
 n

the oering is over-subscribed and goes through;
otherwise, the oering is under-subscribed and fails.
Date 1:  Firm's aftermarket value V (n^
I
; n^
u
) is established.
Date 2:  Firm's true value v is realized (and revealed).
5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The formal model has three dates|0, 1, 2|and contains a rm that is going public
on date 0. The true value of this rm is given by v 2 fv
B
; v
G
g, where v
G
> v
B
, which
is revealed on date 2. Until then, no one has perfect information about v. Everybody
is risk neutral. The riskless rate is zero.
The IPO terms are given by fP
0
; N; n

; n()g, where P
0
denotes the price per share,
N is the total number of shares that will be outstanding after the oering is completed,
and n

represents the minimum number of shares that will be oated in the oering,
meaning that the issue will be withdrawn if the demand for allocations falls short of
n

. Finally, n() 2 [n

; N ] denotes the total number of shares that oated, thus leaving
N   n() shares to be retained by the issuer.
It is assumed that n() is increasing in the demand for allocations, which implies that
the size of the issue will be positively related to demand. As noted, rm commitment
oerings are generally sold with an over-allotment provision and best eorts are sold
with a pre-specied minimum and maximum number of shares to be sold.
The pool of IPO investors contains a total of n
I
+ n
u
investors, where n
I
of these
are well-informed (or `informed') and n
u
are less-informed. Investors become informed
at no cost by observing independent signals s 2 fs
G
; s
B
g (informed investors) and
s
u
2 fs
u
G
; s
u
B
g (less-informed investors). The signal observed by informed investors is
naturally more precise than that observed by less-informed investors.
7
7
Note that the issuer plays no role in the model so whether she has private information or not is
unimportant. In a more general model in which the issuer is given a specic maximization problem to
solve, the precision of her information would aect the optimal IPO terms and hence the number of
informed and uninformed investors, but the basic intuition behind our over/underpricing result would
remain unaected.
4
An investor will request an allocation in the oering only after obtaining favorable
information (a type G signal). Let n^
I
and n^
u
denote the number of informed and
less-informed investors who obtain favorable information and hence submit bids. The
random variables n^
I
and n^
u
are binomially distributed on [0; n
I
] and [0; n
u
]. The total
number of bidders is n^
I
+ n^
u
. Successful bidders are allocated one share each, which
implies that the oering will succeed if n^
I
+ n^
u
 n

and fail otherwise.
The number of shares oated in the oering, n(), is assumed to be increasing in
the demand for allocations, n^
I
+ n^
u
. Specically, let a 2 [0; 1] be a measure of the
degree to which n() is increasing in n^
I
+ n^
u
. In particular, a larger a will mean a
stronger correlation, with the size of the oering perfectly elastic in demand if a = 1,
and perfectly inelastic in demand if a = 0. Also, n() will be increasing in a, with
n(; 0) = n

and n(; 1) = n^
I
+ n^
u
. Finally, the probability of obtaining an allocation
in the oering is (n^
I
; n^
u
) 
n
n^
I
+n^
u
.
Let V (n^
I
; n^
u
) denote the rm's aftermarket value as a function of the number of
investors who obtain favorable information about the rm, and let P (n^
I
; n^
u
) denote the
associated probability.
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It is assumed that V (n^
I
; n^
u
) is increasing in n^
I
and n^
u
, which
is to say that the rm's aftermarket value will reect (at least part of) the information
observed by investors.
The issue is clearly overpriced ex post if NP
0
> V (n^
I
; n^
u
) and underpriced if
NP
0
< V (n^
I
; n^
u
). To generate over- and underpricing in the ex ante sense we need the
expression for the average aftermarket value of completed oerings:
v =

n
u
X
0
n
I
X
n^
P (n^
I
; n^
u
)

 1
n
u
X
0
n
I
X
n^
P (n^
I
; n^
u
)V (n^
I
; n^
u
); (1)
where n^  max(n

  n^
u
; 0). The issue is now overpriced in equilibrium if P
0
> v=N and
underpriced if P
0
< v=N .
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The average initial return, r
0
(say), is given by r
0
=
v
NP
0
 1,
so overpricing implies that IPOs generate negative initial returns on average (r
0
< 0).
8
P () (E()) and P (j) (E(j)) will denote unconditional and conditional probabilities (expecta-
tions) throughout.
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As an alternative to v, we could (as is generally done) use the rm's ex ante expected value v 
P (v
G
)v
G
+ P (v
B
)v
B
when dening over/underpricing. However, it is v that is picked up empirically,
since v implicitly assumes that IPOs never fail, which is not the case in practice. For example,
Beneveniste, Busaba, and Guo (1999) nd failure rates to be high enough to aect the signs of some
of the parameter estimates in their regressions (see also footnote 6). In addition, since v < v, the use of
v implies an analytical bias towards overpricing. So, although v may be appropriate when comparing
dierent degrees of underpricing, it is not if we want to prove the existence of ex ante overpricing.
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3 Overpricing
In this section we derive equilibrium overpricing under the assumption that investors
are homogenous in the precision of their information. Specically, we let the issue
be priced along the participation constraint for informed investors. This implies that
less-informed investors will choose not to participate in the oering.
The participation condition for informed investors is given by:
P (s
G
)
n
I
X
n

P (n^
I
js
G
)(n^
I
)[V (n^
I
)=N   P
0
] = 0; (2)
which reects that an investor will request an allocation only upon obtaining favorable
information about the issue. Solving (2) with respect to NP
0
yields
NP
0
= v
I
; (3)
where
v
I

 
n
I
X
n

P (n^
I
js
G
)(n^
I
)
!
 1
 
n
I
X
n

P (n^
I
js
G
)(n^
I
)V (n^
I
)
!
; (4)
which represents the value of the issue from the perspective of investors observing
favorable signals. In other words, v
I
represents a conditional expectation over post-
issue market value based on favorable information, discounted by the fact that the issue
in general will be rationed (a < 1). Note that v
I
is increasing in a, which is to say that
the value of the issue from the perspective of those investors who request shares in the
oering is decreasing in the extent of rationing. If a = 1, there is no rationing, in which
case v
I
represents an undiscounted expectation conditioned on favorable information.
Recall that the IPO is overpriced in equilibrium if NP
0
= v
I
> v (or r
0
< 0). This
is considered in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the IPO is priced along the participation condition for
informed investors (condition (2)), then if a > 0 the oering is overpriced (r
0
< 0).
Otherwise, if a = 0, then r
0
= 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, if the number of shares oated in the oering is xed (a = 0), then the
IPO in equilibrium will be priced to generate zero excess returns (r
0
= 0). Basically,
with investors homogeneous in the precision of their information, there is no adverse
selection and hence no underpricing, as in Rock. As a natural extention of this result,
it follows that if the number of shares oated is positively related to demand (a > 0),
the IPO, in equilibrium, will be overpriced (r
0
< 0).
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Intuitively, for the IPO to be overpriced in equilibrium, it is necessary that the
valuation v
I
of investors who are actually submitting bids in the oering exceeds the
average aftermarket value v of the issue. To see how this is possible, suppose (for
the sake of argument) that the issuer supplies exactly n^
I
+ n^
u
shares in the oering
(a = 1). In this case, there is no rationing and v
I
represent an undiscounted conditional
expectation over post-issue market value based on favorable information. Since v rep-
resents the corresponding unconditional expectation, the absence of rationing implies
unambigously that v
I
> v. In a competitive market, the issuer puts NP
0
= v
I
, which
implies NP
0
> v and hence overpricing. Suppose then that a < 1, so that the issue in
general will be rationed. This will clearly reduce v
I
, and hence reduce the amount of
overpricing, since v is independent of a, until there is no overpricing at a = 0.
From a slightly dierent perspective, since investors are able to withdraw from
the oering upon observing unfavorable information, their participation gives them a
(potentially) valuable option. Indeed, this option takes a strictly positive value so long
as the number of shares that are oated in the oering is positively related to demand.
In a competitive market, however, the value of this option is captured by the issuer
and manifests itself through average overpricing.
As is well known, option values are increasing in the risk of the underlying asset. For
our setting, this should imply a positive relationship between ex ante uncertainty and
the degree of overpricing. Indeed, this implication is veried in the numerical analysis
conducted in Section 4, and parallels a well known implication of the winner's curse
argument that greater ex ante uncertainty will lead to more underpricing, by increasing
the adverse selection problem facing less-informed investors (Beatty and Ritter, 1986).
One empirical implication of our overpricing result is that if an empirical researcher
measures ex post returns by doing a simple average return across all issues during a
certain period, she will compare the oer price with the unconditional mean and thus
incorrectly conclude that the average return to investors was negative. To measure the
returns actually achieved by IPO investors, she would need investors' conditional ex-
pected returns. One way this could be done is to compute the average return weighted
by the amount raised by the rm (relative amounts indicated in the oering prospec-
tus), since, in equilibrium, type G rms would be able to sell more shares in the IPO
(and therefore raise more money) than type B rms. The idea being that more in-
vestors would obtain a positive signal for type G rms, and therefore more investors
would bid for their shares.
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4 Overpricing or Underpricing?
We now examine the relation between the option value associated with the IPO and
the adverse selection cost. To do this, less-informed investors are re-introduced into
the model.
The issue will then be priced along the participation constraint for less-informed
investors, given by
P (s
u
G
)
n
u
X
1
n
I
X
n^
P (n^
I
; n^
u
js
u
G
)(n^
I
; n^
u
)[V (n^
I
; n^
u
)=N   P
0
] = 0; (5)
which is solved for in terms of NP
0
to yield
NP
0
=
 
n
u
X
1
n
I
X
n^
P (n^
I
; n^
u
js
u
G
)(n^
I
; n^
u
)
!
 1
n
u
X
1
n
I
X
n^
P (n^
I
; n^
u
js
u
G
)(n^
I
; n^
u
)V (n^
I
; n^
u
): (6)
As before, the issue is overpriced if NP
0
> v and underpriced if NP
0
< v, where v
is given by (1). Simulations performed (comparing (1) and (6)) show that the model
generate overpricing as well as underpricing, depending on parameter values.
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The
results from our simulations are reported in tables 2, 3, and 4. They are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The initial return is (i) increasing in the dierence in information pre-
cision between well-informed and less-informed investors, (ii) increasing in the fraction
of well-informed investors; (iiia) increasing in ex-ante uncertainty for issues that are
underpriced in equilibrium, and (iiib) decreasing in ex-ante uncertainty for issues that
are overpriced in equilibrium.
Results (i) - (iiia) are well known implications of the winner's curse argument,
generated here in a setting that allows IPOs to be overpriced as well as underpriced
in equilibrium. Results (iiia) and (iiib) may seem contradictory by implying that
greater ex ante uncertainty will push both towards greater underpricing and towards
greater overpricing.
11
Intuitively, greater ex ante uncertainty increases the extent of
adverse selection, which in itself would lead to more underpricing. Similarly, greater
ex ante uncertainty will increase the option value in the IPO, pulling towards more
10
For the purpose of the simulations, we put n() = an

+ (1   a)(n^
I
+ n^
u
); a 2 (0; 1); V (n^
I
; n^
u
)
was calculated as a conditional expectation based on (n^
I
; n^
u
). The Mathematica code that was used
is available upon request.
11
Although our simulations are not exhaustive, we have been unable to generate any other pattern.
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nI
n
I
+n
u
.05 .20 .35 .50 .65 .80 .95
r
0
-2.97% -0.65% 1.77% 4.32% 6.95% 9.60% 12.11%
Table 2: The table relates the initial return r
0
to the fraction of informed investors
n
I
n
I
+n
u
for
parameters P (s
G
jv
G
) = :85; P (s
B
jv
B
) = :7; P (s
u
G
jv
G
) = :6; P (s
u
B
jv
B
) = 0:55; P (v
G
) = :65; v
G
=
2000; v
B
= 0; n

= 5; n
I
+ n
u
= 20; and a = :20.
 0 .10 .20 .30 .35
r
0
-4.49% -1.44% 7.59% 22.25% 31.83%
Table 3: The table relates the initial return r
0
to the dierence in information precision between
informed and less-informed investors,  = P (s
i
jv
i
)   P (s
u
i
jv
i
). The parameter values used are
P (s
G
jv
G
) = P (s
B
jv
B
) = :85; v
G
= 2000; v
B
= 0; n

= 5; P (v
G
) = :5; n
I
= n
u
= 10; and a = :20:
Note also that P (s
u
G
jv
G
) = P (s
u
B
jv
B
), starting at .85 ( = 0) and going to .5 ( = :35).
overpricing. The issue will be overpriced in equilibrium to the extent that the value of
option exceeds the corresponding adverse selection cost. Implications (iiia) and (iiib)
combined suggest that if the option value exceeds the adverse selection cost to yield
overpricing at a low level of ex ante uncertainty, it will continue to do so at higher levels
of uncertainty (and vice versa). One implication of this result is that over/underpricing
cannot be explained by looking at dierences in risk, which may help to explain why
overpricing has been documented in such relatively diverse claims as REITs (which are
relatively risky) and investment grade bonds (which are relatively safe).
The positive relation predicted between underpricing and ex ante uncertainty is well
documented (see e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Interestingly enough, Wang, Chan, and
Gau (1992) nd a signicant positive relation between the degree of overpricing and ex
ante uncertainty in their sample of REITs IPOs, which they suggest is \inconsistent
with existing IPO theories." Their evidence, however, is clearly consistent with the
present model, and hence not inconsistent with the winner's curse argument.
Examining corporate bonds IPOs, Datta, Iskander-Datta, and Patell (1997) nd
overpricing for investment grade bonds and underpricing for junk grade bonds. Based
on informal inferences from Rock, it may be tempting to attribute this nding in part
to dierences in risk. However, as already indicated, (iiia) and (iiib) suggest that it is
not so much dierences in risk that contribute to this result, but other factors such as
the type and composition of investors as well as the amount of asymmetric information.
Indeed, as a testable implication, (iiia) and (iiib) predict that the initial return will
be decreasing in bond rating for investment grade bonds and increasing in bond rating
for junk grade bonds.
In general, our model predicts overpricing unless the adverse selection problem is
9
2
ex ante
.25 .50 .75 1.00 1.25 1.50
r
0
> 0 2.03% 3.42% 4.43% 5.20% 5.80% 8.52%
r
0
< 0 -1.48% -2.53% -3.32% -3.92% -4.40% -6.63%
Table 4: The table relates the initial return r
0
to ex-ante uncertainty for parameter values
P (s
G
jv
G
) = :85; P (s
B
jv
B
) = :7; P (s
u
G
jv
G
) = :65; P (s
u
B
jv
B
) = 0:55; v
B
= 0; E(v) = P (v
G
)v
G
= 800;
n

= 5; n
I
= n
u
= 10; and a = :20. To generate r
0
> 0 [r
0
< 0], we let P (s
u
G
jv
G
) = :65 [P (s
u
jv
G
) = :7].
too severe. This is consistent with the general evidence on over/underpricing. For
example, as already noted, the evidence on IPOs of corporate bonds (Datta et al.,
1997) shows that junk grade bonds are underpriced on average, while investment grade
bonds are overpriced. Since asymmetric information and hence adverse selection is
less of a problem in investment grade bonds than in junk grade bonds, this evidence
is consistent with our model (and hence Rock). Similarly, Ling and Ryngaert (1997)
nd that the overpricing result of Wang et al. (1992) switches to underpricing in more
recent data. Consistent with our model, Ling and Ryngaert nd this switch to be
associated with greater institutional participation and more asymmetric information
(and not changes in underlying risk). Finally, as noted in the Introduction, there is
evidence of overpricing in closed-end funds IPOs. These are claims on already traded
assets, so the extent of adverse selection is likely to be low, which is consistent with
our model.
5 Concluding Remarks
Consistent with the empirical evidence, the present paper develops a model that shows
that IPOs may be overpriced in equilibrium as well as underpriced. The model ties
overpricing to the winner's curse argument of Rock (1986), and shows that if less-
informed investors obtain independent signals about the issue and if the size of the
oering can be increased in the face of strong demand, then there may be overpricing
rather than underpricing in equilibrium despite the presence of adverse selection. Rock
shows that underpricing arises from adverse selection in the allocation of shares causing
the distribution that generates the returns observed in the market to stochastically
dominate (in the rst order sense) the allocation weighted distribution relevant to the
marginal investor. The present paper shows that a more general specication of the
IPO market may reverse this return dominance to generate overpricing in equilibrium,
rather than underpricing.
More generally, investors obtain independent signals and will withdraw from the
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oering upon observing unfavorable information. Participating in the oering, there-
fore, gives each investor a potentially valuable option. In a competitive market, the
value of this option is captured by the issuer and will result in overpricing to the ex-
tent that it exceeds the corresponding adverse selection cost. In this sense, overpricing
represents a benet of going public and reects the ability of the issuer to extract in-
formational rents from investors, just as underpricing represents a cost of going public
due to adverse selection.
As is well known, greater risk increases the adverse selection problem facing less-
informed investors, and thus leads to more underpricing. In the present setting, how-
ever, greater risk also increases the option value embedded in the oering, thus in-
creasing the potential for overpricing. Hence, whether the issue, in equilibrium, will be
overpriced or underpriced will not be determined by dierences in risk. Instead, our
model suggests this will be determined by other factors such as the degree of asym-
metric information between investors, as well as by the fraction of well-informed to
less-informed investors in the market. This was shown to be consistent with the overall
evidence on over/underpricing. In addition, the model is able to account for why over-
pricing has been detected in diverse claims such as REITs (which are relatively risky)
and investment grade bonds (which are relatively safe).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: The issue is overpriced if NP
0
= v
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> v. With only
informed investors present in the market, it will be the case that
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Observe further that v
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I
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It follows that r
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) is increasing in n^
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Using (A:10) and (A:6) in (A:3) yields
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Since n(; a) is strictly increasing in n^
I
for a 2 (0; 1], it follows that R(n^
I
; a) is
strictly inceasing in n^
I
for a 2 (0; 1]. Hence, r
0
> 0 for a 2 (0; 1]: Finally, since
R(; 0) =
n
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I
P (s
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)
= constant, it follows that r
0
= 0 at a = 0. tu
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